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‘You, my body, and my mind, one of these will go’: Madness as Disguise in 
Samuel Beckett's Murphy and Endgame. 
Carmen Méndez García 
 
“A man without a mask is indeed very rare. One even doubts the possibility of 
such a man” (Laing, Divided Self 95) 
 
The concept of disguise has a wide range of reference, covering from its strictly 
physical meaning to the metaphorical depths of concealment and deceit. Somewhere in the 
middle of this continuum, near the psychic connotation of this concept, we could place the 
idea of madness as a disguise, i.e., the use of a feigned madness which is shown as an attire 
that conceals or screens real intentions and meanings. In the following pages, we will try to 
prove how the theories of psychiatrist R. D. Laing on schizophrenia provide a most useful 
frame to approach the notion of self concealment through disguise in the works of Samuel 
Beckett, especially Murphy and Endgame. These two texts are not, however, the only ones 
where we find intertwined notions of mental breakdown, disguise, and concealment. Thus, 
we will make reference to other works by Beckett, an extremely important need in this 
analysis, if we are to take into account the complexity and intertextuality in the works of 
this prolific writer, so as to justify the kind of approach we will deal with. 
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The notion of madness is usually introduced by Beckett through three main uses of 
disguise. The first one is the creation of a false-self system (we are drawing heavily on 
Laing's theories here, as we will later analyse), which is both a disguise and a barrier 
between the "real" (inner) self and the world. Secondly, Beckett's characters make use of a 
language that has been frequently seen as quintessentially existentialist: for us, beyond this 
undoubtedly accurate notion, characters in Beckett's plays and fiction also make extensive 
use of language to mask real meaning. Thus, we find a new use of disguise: that of a 
"disguised" language, which could be identified, reverting to Laing once again, to the 
"schizophrenese" he analyses in The Divided Self. 
 
Finally, characters in Murphy and Endgame show in their interactions (as far as 
personal interaction be taken as something related to intention and not to actual movement 
and action, which is by no means abounding in Beckett's work) what we could refer to as 
"schizophrenic behaviour": a conduct which is (in the etymological sense of schizophrenic, 
i.e., divided or cloven mind1) divided and separated both from the “normal” conduct 
dictated by society and from the inner self we referred to earlier. This behaviour also 
masks real intentions, in a desperate effort for the self to defend itself from external 
obstructions and influences, in a very similar course of action to that related to 
schizophrenic language. 
 
Reasons for Disguising. Creation of a false-self system 
 
Every kind of disguise (both in its literal sense of clothing, and in a metaphorical 
sense of the kind we are concerning ourselves with) involves an act of creation, of 
adapting a set of fabrics and props around an object or body. The individual who disguises 
himself lays a series of clothes around his physique, so as to make the original body (or 
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identity) unrecognisable. The schizophrenic creation of a disguise for the self follows a 
most similar process: an inner self (which the schizophrenic identifies with his/her "true 
being") is hidden through the use of one or more successive layers of "false selves" which, 
much like clothes around the body, conceal and disguise the inner self until it cannot be 
identified by the gaze of the other - this is intended as a survival and defence strategy 
against the baring and appropriating gaze of "the other". After all, “[b]eing visible is [. . .]  
a basic biological risk; being invisible is a basic biological defence. We all employ some 
form of camouflage” (Laing, Divided Self 110)2. 
 
The mechanisms behind this creation of a false-self system were first explained by 
R. D. Laing in his 1960 book The Divided Self. This theory on the alienating nature of 
mental illness, and, more precisely, schizophrenia, is particularly useful in the study of 
Beckett's alienated and existentially handicapped (or over-endowed) characters. 
 
A key factor in the creation of false-self systems is precisely one of the main traits 
in Beckett´s characters: an excess of self-consciousness, which heightens the awareness of 
one’s being as judged by others. This amplifies the danger of being recognized and forces 
the use of camouflage: the defences used by schizophrenics are serialised by Laing as 
“[b]eing like everyone else, being someone other than the self, playing a part, being  
incognito, anonymous, being nobody (psychotically, pretending to have no body)” (Laing, 
Divided Self 111, emphasis added). Thus, roles and masks are, as Vernon says, “[an] armor 
against the weight of the Other, against the world’s attempts to control” (23). All these 
mechanisms, in linguistic or behavioural avatars, will be used by the characters Beckett 
depicts in his plays and novels3. 
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The need for Beckett's characters (which are, in more than one sense, as 
representative of this theory as any of Laing's case studies) to protect themselves leads to 
the creation of what Harvey defines as an "abortive self, a being somehow stunted, 
undeveloped, but more real, more authentic than the public man, who seems closer to the 
second or third person than to the first” (556). This false-self, this disguise, is not only 
created by the schizophrenic, but is also portrayed as a tabula rasa or palimpsest in which 
every character around him/her imprint their expectations. Thus, for example, each 
character around Murphy sees in him what they intend to see, and try to have their 
expectations confirmed in the face Murphy shows to the world, one which is very different 
from his real, inner being - Murphy regards himself as having an “unredeemed split self” 
(Beckett, Murphy 188)4. Celia, herself “a close system in miniature, the ideal place [. . .] 
for Murphy to reconcile body and mind” (Warger 15), tries to find hints of this completed 
body-mind system in Murphy, to no effect. Neary, a sensualist, intends to completely 
separate body and mind, not with the aim of living purely in the mind, as Murphy, but 
rather to appease his sensual appetites. Mr Kelly is a paralytic, kept apart from sensual 
desires, with a lucid mind but without Murphy’s desire to submerge himself in it leaving 
the outside world apart. These are, as analysed by Warger, “token-characters, whose 
mental states give information that must be accounted for in order to put Murphy’s in any 
kind of perspective” (16).  Murphy, however, is able to keep himself clear from these 
expectations of the other characters, mainly through the use of his non-porous suit, which 
“admitted no air from the outer world, [and] allowed none of Murphy’s own vapours to 
escape” (Beckett, Murphy 72) 
 
In this sense, as we see, the disguise is tailored not only by the disguised, but also 
by those who surround him: Laing states how “what others attribute to [a person] [. . .], 
implicitly or explicitly, necessarily plays a decisive part in forming [. . .] [his/her] sense of 
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his [/her] own agency, perceptions, motives, inventions: his identity” (Self and Others 
151). The paradoxical nature of this disguise for the self is that it does not fulfil its 
intended purpose, i.e., enabling the participation in the world without the danger of 
destroying the inner self. More often than not, the world is, in the words of Laing, 
"experienced as unreal, and all that belongs to this system is felt to be false, futile, and 
meaningless" (Divided Self 80). The natural reaction to this futility in the world is, 
precisely, what drives Murphy to his inner self, his mind, which is fantastically divided and 
elaborated into different uncharted territories: he considers it to be a “large hollow sphere, 
hermetically closed to the universe without” (Beckett, Murphy 107) - thus signalling its 
similitude with the cosmos and its existence as an alternative world, where he intends to 
live -, divided into three zones which are hierarchically arranged depending on the amount 
of objects and laws from the outer world which are allowed in each circle. The deepest 
zone (what Murphy refers to as “the dark zone”) aspires to Murphy’s being able to 
function completely apart from the world and purely in his mind. In this dark zone, chaos 
can be reorganised and re-created to give birth to new aesthetic orders completely different 
from those imposed by society. 
 
However, as Murphy tries to go deeper into his hierarchically arranged mind, 
removing layers and masks, he is less connected to the world, and becomes further 
removed from his external persona, what leads to the failure of this defence mechanism: 
other kinds of disguises must be used. We will touch upon these next. 
 
Behavioural Disguises 
 
A different meaning of disguise as referred to madness, while at the same time one 
deeply related to our previous commentary, is the concealment of real intentions through 
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what we could term "behavioural disguises", i.e., modifications of socially acceptable 
conduct which prevent the recognition of true intentions. In this sense, through a series of 
eccentricities (which often fulfil the stereotype of the behaviour which is expected from a 
mentally-ill person), both Murphy and Mr Endon (in Murphy) and several characters in 
Endgame, manage to camouflage their inner selves and what they represent, “as a 
smokescreen to hide behind” (Laing, Divided Self 163). 
 
This "schizophrenic" behaviour, which withholds the knowledge on the part of the 
other of the task of self-discovery these characters are embarked into, assumes a series of 
varied (and even completely opposite) guises: thus, the nearly-catatonic state of Mr Endon, 
the schizophrenic Murphy meets at Magdalen Mental Mercyseat asylum5, is the result of a 
complete separation of the self both from conscience and from the world. Ironically 
described, as we will see later, as a “schizo of the most amiable variety [. . .] [with] a 
psychosis so limpid and imperturbable that Murphy felt drawn to it as Narcissus to his 
fountain” (Beckett, Murphy 186), his interactions with others are almost inexistent due to 
his semi-permanent state of catatonia. This complete annihilation of the connection with 
external reality is metaphorically introduced in the chess game that involves Murphy and 
Mr Endon6, in which, in a catatonic state (as far as catatonic makes reference to a 
withdrawal from outward stimuli), Mr Endon is not playing against Murphy, but rather 
moving the chess pieces around the table in a completely idiosyncratic design which 
Murphy cannot fight against or imitate, while also being unable to attract Mr Endon’s 
attention. This moment of facing the complete void of Mr Endon's mind (by social 
standards)7- provokes the further withdrawal of Murphy into his mind, something he had 
attempted through the use of his rocking chair and which now becomes his primary and 
only intention (and one which will, paradoxically, cause his death): “The relation between 
Mr Murphy and Mr Endon could not have been better summed up than by the former’s 
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sorrow at seeing himself in the latter’s immunity from seeing anything but himself” 
(Beckett, Murphy 250). 
 
These real intentions which are disguised through eccentricities in Murphy (for 
example, the way he handles usual tasks such as eating, by organising items of food in 
every mathematically available combination as a prerequisite to their ingestion) are no 
other than the retreat into his own mind, to annihilate or get beyond the point of no return 
for the physical part of the self; thus the semi-orgasmic, slackened state of the rocking 
forth and back Murphy uses to penetrate the depths of his own mind. To Laing, "this 
detachment of the self means that the self is never revealed directly in the individuals' 
expressions and actions, nor does it experience anything spontaneously or immediately" 
(Divided Self  80). These periods of retreat, and the means (for example, through the use of 
a rocking chair) used to achieve them, are unknown to all the other characters in the novel, 
so the unaccountable death of Murphy comes as a complete surprise. However, all these 
peculiar conducts on the part of Murphy (getting nude and tying himself to a chair, 
justifying his existence and behaviour in relation to an astrological card, or arranging his 
food are some examples8) are nothing but attempts to reach a definite state of catatonia, 
one in which mind and body are completely separate (here we take up again the idea of a 
disembodied, "inner" self), and which allows for the plunge and self-discovery of the secret 
life of Murphy's mind, the inner cosmos we described earlier.  
 
Another defence mechanism, and one which has been noticed not only by Laing, 
but also by Wilfred Bion9 (“Notes on the Theory of Schizophrenia”, in his book Second 
Thoughts) is the projection of unwanted parts of the personality into other people (in this 
case, characters). These parts of the personality, which may be one or several - or even “a 
whole system of personas, some ‘possible’ socially, others not, some compulsive, other 
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deliberately developed” (Laing, Divided Self 101), are propped into a series of manikins: 
the other characters, since for the schizophrenic the person beyond this disguise comes to 
be ignored, in a reification of the other that tries to keep him/her from being human and, 
therefore, from the ability of psychologically hunting the personality of the schizophrenic. 
 
We find a series of these "split selves" in Endgame, where every character can be 
seen as the container of a residual (and both unacknowledged and unwanted) part of 
Hamm.10. This analysis of the characters in Endgame, based on the belief in the existence 
of a "multiple persona system” would mark Hamm as the "inner self", basically irrational 
and emotional, while Clov is the "rational" or "outer" self, which tries to relate to the 
external world. Hamm, an invalid in a wheelchair, never moves or looks through the 
window: Clov is the one who has to see and interact with the external world, as a servant: 
if we analyse the rationale behind the creation of the false (disguised) self, the inner self 
expects the false-self to serve him by delegating to it the deals with the world11. Hamm 
seems to be perfectly aware of all the other beings in the play as a creation of his mind 
when he considers how his life, his fiction, will come to an end “unless I bring in other 
characters” (Beckett, Endgame 118). 
 
The two other characters in Endgame (Nagg and Nell, which do not present 
themselves in a binary opposition, as Hamm and Clov do) are introduced as the "parents" 
of Hamm. They represent a set of memories which are slowly disappearing: in most of 
their utterances, they show a deep yearning for an organised, non-chaotic world, one 
completely different to the present one (the world view of the invalid, fragile, inner self 
represented by Hamm12). Order becomes thus a concept equated to past: “I love the old 
questions. [With fervour]. Ah the old questions, the old answers, there’s nothing like 
them!” (Beckett, Endgame 110). 
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Nagg and Nell's function in the play, apart from their acting as mementoes, does 
not go beyond their use as blind and worn manikins for Hamm to "hang" the disguises of 
order he used to wear (or remembers himself as wearing), and which are now moth-eaten. 
The death of these two characters is not quite as relevant as the separation of Hamm and 
Clov by the end of the play, or rather, the desertion of the house on the part of Clov (the 
house, a closed cosmos, is a metaphor for the mind-world Hamm and the others inhabit: 
moreover, the layout of windows and doors resemble that of a skull13). The false-self, the 
one who relates to the external world - and from whose experience the inner self 
vicariously takes advantage - leaves, and thus the whole system of false-self which Hamm 
had built to protect himself is destroyed. 
  
This constellation of selves, a result of the atomisation of the original personality, 
and which are distorted attires for the inner self, can also be found in other plays by 
Beckett: in The Unnamable, the narrator compares himself to a masker, and refers to those 
surrounding him as wearing parts of himself and providing him with new sets of clothes: 
“They loaded me down with their trappings and stoned me through the carnival” (325). 
Likewise, in the set of characters we are analysing in Murphy14, the straight "Newtonian” 
Neary, with his analytic view of the world, is the opposite of Murphy's fantasy of living in 
the mind. Celia is, according to Warger, a "forlorn model of normalcy" (14), who 
embodies a series of values and has a practical and measured mind which Murphy can't 
acknowledge in himself. But not only does Murphy "give away" these undesired traits into 
the rest of the characters in this constellative system of selves, but also, these rejected (and 
fragmented) pieces of the self seek a counterpart in Murphy, trying to acknowledge, 
unsuccessfully, those characteristics that define them in Murphy: this search is doomed to 
failure, since their array is made up, as their main element, of those pieces of cloth that 
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Murphy has stripped himself away of. The circle of "Murphy's acquaintances [. . .] [which] 
represent the limits of his being and a gross schematisation of the forces working on him" 
(Warger 14), therefore, embodies a series of attires Murphy is not willing to try on himself 
(on what he considers his "authentic" or "inner" self). All of these characters, incidentally, 
gather around Murphy by the end of the novel, symbolising how the inner self cannot 
survive its own creation, the false-self system, and the futility to retire completely into the 
world of the mind. 
 
Disguised Language 
 
But, rather than behaviour, in the sense of characters doing things and interacting, 
Beckett’s plays predominantly refer to a form of expression which does not have the 
physical (i.e., body or movement) as a basis, but rather, the output of the mind in society: 
we are referring to the means of expression (or lack of expression) par excellence in 
Beckett’s plays: language. Characters in most Beckett’s plays and fiction endlessly (and, 
more often than not, meaninglessly) talk and soliloquise, while seemingly unable to 
connect with the other through the use of a common language with a shared repository of 
words. 
 
The existential element in Beckett has already been dealt with in depth15, and a 
close analysis of what it implies is well beyond the intentions of this paper. We will, 
however, appropriate the term “existential” and relate it to The Divided Self, whose author 
himself defines, in his Preface to the Original Edition as “the first of a series of studies in 
existential psychology and psychiatry” (9). The notion of ontological insecurity, of a 
fragile identity which can be destroyed by the gaze of the other, and which precipitates the 
creation of a false-self system, impels the schizophrenic characters in Beckett to use 
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language as a disguise for real meaning. The inner self is felt to be beyond the reach of 
common thought and language, so a specific and idiosyncratic language is imagined, 
invented and used by the mentally ill characters to serve the interactions between 
themselves and reality. 
 
Two notions of language are being used here: on the one hand, an alienating and 
meaningless language, the one employed by society, which is useless in the search for the 
self because it cannot be applied to inner vision, removed as this language is from the 
individual. On the other side of the spectrum, we find a highly solipsist language, which 
accurately reflects the workings of the self, but which cannot be expressed, since it is 
inapprehensible and incommunicable.16 Somewhere in between these two notions is the 
disguised language of the schizophrenic, what Laing terms “schizophrenese”  and which is 
the one that we, as readers, perceive – this is a language that scarcely fits everyday reality, 
but rather accommodates to the schizophrenic view of the world and is closer to inner 
language: meaningless and incomprehensible, as such, by social standards. One of Laing’s 
case studies in The Divided Self asserts that “we schizophrenics say and do a lot of stuff 
that is unimportant, and then we mix important things in with all this to see if the doctor 
cares enough to see and feel them” (164).  
 
Odd and eccentric as it may seem, then, the artificial language used by characters in 
Beckett’s plays can be understood if we analyse it as a kind of “false system”, which 
parallels the re-elaboration and concealment of self we have been dealing with up to now: 
this “false language” (as opposed both to “inner language” and to the language of society) 
aims then, equally, to dissemble true meaning, by obscuring it. Thus, Murphy, we are told, 
does “not speak at all in the ordinary way unless spoken to, and not always even then” 
(Beckett, Murphy 250).  Moreover, this idiosyncratic language can only be understood by 
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the mind that produces it, by a plethora of invented replications of that mind itself, and the 
characters are condemned to “babble, babble, words, like the solitary child who turns 
himself into children, two, three, so as to speak together, in the dark” (Beckett, Endgame 
126). 
 
The language of society, then, is not satisfactory due to a series of reasons: it is a 
creation which is alien to the individual (i.e. not created by the subject, but imposed on him 
by the human groups s/he is forced to belong to) and it acts as a repository for socially 
dictated relations between signifier and signified, between word and object: it emphasises 
“the collective, the impersonal, the familiar, and can say nothing of the individual, the 
personal, the unforeseen” (Copeland 199). While this societal language is satisfactory up to 
a certain extent, since it provides labels that keep down distressing ambiguities, it still does 
not belong in an individual and creative way to those who use it17: it cannot be applied to 
the inner vision of the individual.  
 
The rejection of this prescribed language completely keeps the individual from 
communicating at all: schizophrenic characters in Beckett, while trying to live only in their 
own  minds, yet yearn for human contact, so they have to turn to an altered language that is 
satisfactory enough for their inner selves, yet sufficiently garbled so as not to expose their 
undisguised identity.  
 
Thus, Murphy is described by Neary as a "seedy solipsist" (Beckett, Murphy 82): 
this label can be related to the use Murphy (and most other characters in the book) makes 
of language: an idiosyncratic command of words and terms in which phonetics, for 
example, tends to obscure meaning through apparently pointless repetitions of homophone 
words, alliterations, etc. In this sense, some puns or constructions of words are merely 
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related to their phonetics, and the link between signifier and signified is replaced by a 
series of associations based on word sounds, a nexus between object and word that goes 
against the standard (or "social") use of language.  
 
The artificial manner, speech and quotations that appear extensively in Beckett's 
work can be related to the concept, expressed by Copeland, of how "words can never 
convey anything beyond the surface personality" (195). This surface personality, if equated 
with the false-self the schizophrenic shows to the world (and we find grounds to do so), 
reflects how the use of this diacritical, apparently dead and socially unintelligible language 
must bear the same doom that the constructed inner self found, and how it's destined to 
wither and destroy any possibility of meaningful communication with the other. The 
language Murphy uses is “spattered with words that went dead as soon as they sounded; 
each word obliterated, before it had time to make sense, by the word that came next; so 
that in the end [. . .] [Celia] did not know what had been said. It was like difficult music 
heard for the first time” (Beckett, Murphy 40). However, this adorned language is the only 
defence mechanism, linguistically speaking, which is available to the schizophrenic: in 
Endgame, Hamm complains about language being removed from reality, thus losing its 
meaningfulness: "I use the words you taught me. If they don't mean anything any more, 
teach me others. Or let me be silent" (113) 
 
This nostalgia for a non-outworn language is also shown in Beckett's play Happy 
Days, a play entirely made of words, in which the movement is nonexistent (one of the 
characters is buried in a mound of earth, and the only thing we apprehend from the other 
character is his voice). Language in Happy Days is marked by the meaningless repetition 
of words and concepts, illogical connection of ideas, and long rants in which the two 
characters are unable to communicate with each other, buried as they are in their own 
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soliloquies: both, however, revert to memories of a past when language was  meaningful 
and allowed for interpersonal communication.   
 
Through the use of this artificial and adorned language, its reliance on sounds rather 
than on content, and its abuse of clichés, dog Latin (mainly Neary in Murphy) and endless 
repetitions, Beckett's characters, rather than talking to each other, (and thus achieving 
communication), limit themselves to the exchange of monologues or soliloquies, what Sass 
terms "word-salad monologue [. . .], a simulacrum of schizophrenic speech so filled with 
vagueness, empty repetition, and stereotyped or obscure phrases that it achieves nearly 
total incoherence" (189). The desocialization of schizophrenic speech thus “seems to 
involve a turning away from the human community and a focus instead on expressing the 
inner life” (Sass 197) 
 
The schizophrenic, then, refuses the clothes of socially standard language, made up 
of words which cannot reflect inner life and which screen the individual from himself, 
since they are alien to him: this language of society excluded, they choose to use a 
distorted language in the hope that this “new” language will be able to be in accordance 
with the inner self, while also protecting it from external menaces. Such a task is 
impossible, as is the whole retreat into the mind and the use of masks we have analysed in 
this paper. The ultimate result of all these described disguises for the self into which 
Beckett’s characters embark themselves is described in Beckett’s last work, The 
Unnamable, in the following terms: “Am I clothed? I have often asked myself this 
question, then suddenly started talking about Malone’s hat, or Molloy’s greatcoat, or 
Murphy’s suit [. . .] They have made me waste my time, suffer for nothing [. . .] They 
never suffered my pains, their pains are nothing compared to mine [. . .] There is no one 
here but me [. . .] All is silent.” (303-305, passim).  
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NOTES 
                                                
1 From Greek schizo, “cloven, in composition” and fren, “mind” (Chambers English Dictionary, 7th 
ed. 1988.) 
2 This idea of the menacing gaze of the other is taken by Laing (who has been defined as an 
“existentialist psychiatrist”) from Jean Paul Sartre: the concept of the gaze of the other robbing us of our 
identity and externally redefining it by judging us, the inescapable “être pour l’autre” can be found in most of 
Sartre’s works – L’être et le néant (1956), La Nausée (1938),and Huis Clos (1944), among others. 
3 Also, we must consider that many of the main characters in Beckett’s plays (though not in the ones 
we are dealing with) are writers or artists: the already heightened sense of self of the creator is here matched 
with the problems of self-consciousness brought about by schizophrenic disorders. 
4 Also, Murphy as a name makes reference both to ‘Morphe’ (related to his ability to be transformed 
by the gaze of the other) and to ‘Morpheus’ (undoubtedly referred to his wish to retire from the conscious 
world and to dwell in the underworld of his own mind). 
5 The Magdalen Mental Mercyseat, the asylum where Murphy gets a position, is described as full of 
“[m]elancholics, motionless and brooding, holding their heads or bellies according to type. Paranoids, 
feverishly covering sheets of paper with complaints against their treatment or verbatim reports of their inner 
voices. A hebephrenic playing the piano intently. A hippomanic teaching slosh to a Korsakow’s syndrome. 
An emaciated schizoid, petrified in a toppling attitude as though condemned to an eternal tableau vivant [. . 
.]” (Beckett, Murphy 168). This idea of mental hospitals as fancy-dress balls had already been analysed by 
Foucault in his book Madness and Civilization.  
6 ‘Endon’ is Greek for ‘inside’: Mr Endon, in this sense, is perceived by Murphy as living purely 
inside, in his mind: the state Murphy himself aspires to. 
7 Mr Endon is shown, in his catatonia and solipsism, as quintessentially inhabiting a universe of de-
mentia in the etymological sense of the word, i.e., the non-existence of a mind thinking and reasoning behind 
the physical body.  
8 In The Politics of the Family, the obsessive element which is pervasive in schizophrenia, which 
leads to order and reorder objects from the external world is analysed as a function of the need to preserve the 
schizophrenic’s internal world (Laing, The Politics of the Family, 13) 
9 Wilfred Bion, 1897-1979. One of the foremost figures in psychoanalysis in the 20th c., Bion 
underwent training analysis with John Rickman and Melanie Klein, who was at the time revolutionizing the 
British Psycho-Analytical Society with her controversial theories. Bion considered himself a Freudian-
Kleinian psychoanalyst, and his research touched upon such a vast field as the study of group processes, the 
origin schizophrenia and psychotic though processes, and communication in mother-infant dyads in the 
context of Melanie Klein’s projective identification theory. Included among his major published works are 
Experiences in Groups (1961), Learning from Experience (1962), Elements of Psychoanalysis (1963), 
Transformations (1965), Second Thoughts (1967) and Attention and Interpretation (1970). 
10 This idea of several personalities existing in the same head in other plays by Beckett has been 
analysed by Edith Kern in ‘Moran-Molloy: The Hero as Author’ (1959), where Molloy is said to be “the 
stirrings within Moran of a subconscious, antithetical self” (187). 
1111 “The ‘inner self’ is occupied in phantasy and in observation. It observes the process of 
perception and action. Experience does not impinge (or at any rate this is the intention) directly on this self, 
and the individual’s acts are not self-expressions. Direct relationships with the world are the province of a 
false-self system” (Laing, Divided Self  94) 
12 The notion of Nell, Nagg and Clov as projected parts of Hamm, and dependent on him, is 
explained by the etymology of their names: Hammer (‘Hamm’) controls Clov (French ‘Clou’, i.e. ‘Nail’), 
Nell (an homophone of “nail”), and Nagg (from ‘Naggel’, German also for ‘Nail’). 
13 The hallucinatory schizophrenic experience of having several personalities inside the 
schizophrenic’s head was already pointed out by Schreber, the most prominent psychotic case of Freud’s, 
who felt as if he had “several individuals in one and the same skull” (Schreber, 86). 
14 All of them considered puppets by Beckett, “except Murphy, who is not a puppet” (Beckett, 
Murphy 122) 
15 See, for example, analysis by Elovaara, Raili. The Problem of Identity in Samuel Beckett’s Prose: 
an Approach from Philosophies of Existence. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1976; Dobrez, L. A. C. 
The Existential and its Exits: Literary and Philosophical Perspectives on the Works of Beckett, Ionesco, 
Genet and Pinter. London: Athlone Press and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986; or Kern, Edith. Existential 
Thought and Fictional Technique: Kierkegaard, Sartre, Beckett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.  
16 Revolutionary narrative techniques to describe the proceedings of the mind, introduced by 
Modernist writers and still in use, such as the stream of consciousness, are necessarily elaborated and 
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provided with a narrative and literary form: as such, they can only act as approximations to the ineffable 
inner speech we are referring to. 
17 We should here, again, consider the role of artists in many of Beckett’s protagonists: they are 
condemned to tell, while alienated from a language that allows them to do it truthfully. 
